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United States Patent and Trademark Office v.
Booking.com B.V.: How Do We Know When
Something Is a Name?
“The Container Store” is the name of a U.S. retail chain of stores that sell
storage boxes, organizing supplies, and the like. The company currently
holds a federal trademark registration for the mark “The Container
Store,”1 presumably based on the conclusion by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office that when consumers encounter that phrase—perhaps
typically with the benefit of the capitalization above—they understand it to
be the name of the store and not simply a description. If this is true,
should the fact that the mark consists of a generic term (“container store”)
preceded by a definite article (“the”) preclude it from being recognized as
a name? In other words, which should take precedence: consumer
recognition of “The Container Store” as a trademark or concerns about
competitors who want to describe themselves as “container stores”
without fear of a lawsuit from The Container Store? Can these two
concerns be reconciled?
United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.2 is
framed as a simple case on its facts. Booking.com is a company that offers
travel reservation services over the Internet. It applied to register
“Booking.com” as a trademark. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) rejected that application on the grounds that “booking” is
generic for the services that the company provides and that the addition of
“.com” does nothing to change that status. The U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, on review, concluded that consumers
understood “Booking.com” to be descriptive of the company’s services and
that the term had acquired secondary meaning and was therefore
distinctive.3 The USPTO appealed only the determination that
“Booking.com” is not generic; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit then affirmed the district court’s ruling.4 Thus, as the case came to
the U.S. Supreme Court, the question was this: What should be the basis
for determining whether a claimed trademark is, in fact, a generic term or
a proper name—the difference between “apple” for fruit and “Apple” for
computers?
The Court concluded that consumer perception is the touchstone. (Justice
Ginsburg wrote the opinion for an eight-member majority, with Justice
Sotomayor writing a separate concurring opinion and Justice Breyer
dissenting.) Because a generic term is a term for “a class of goods or
services,” and because consumers, according to the record below, “do not
perceive the term ‘Booking.com’ to signify online hotel-reservation
services as a class,” the term “Booking.com” is a name for a particular
service rather than a generic term for such services as a group.5 In other
words, noted the Court, because consumers don’t ask each other who their
favorite Booking.com is, and don’t refer to competitors such as Travelocity
as a Booking.com, the term “Booking.com” is not, as a whole, a generic
term.6 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the U.S. Patent and
https://www.gwlr.org/booking-com-b-v-how-do-we-know-when-something-is-a-name/
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Trademark Office erred when it refused registration for the term on the
grounds that, as a rule, “[generic].com” is necessarily also generic.7
But the Court’s opinion isn’t as straightforward as it purports to be.
Booking.com is the name of the corporate party to the case. It is also the
name of a travel reservation service on the Internet. When news
articlesdiscuss the company, they refer to it as Booking.com. Booking.com
is also, in shorthand form, the URL for the website where one can access
the company’s services (the full URL of which is
https://www.booking.com/). And the failure to clarify these distinctions, I
think, is what complicates the Court’s opinion. Consumers might, for
example, see “Booking.com” as a trademark, given the way that the
company has marketed its services under this name, but would not see
www.booking.com as a trademark. In much the same way, consumers
might see Nike as a trademark, but not www.nike.com or
www.sneakers.com (if that URL were to resolve to the Nike website).
Indeed, in a truly hypothetical world, the company could have called itself
“Booking.com” and sought a trademark registration for that name without
ever having secured the domain name www.booking.com. (This decision,
of course, would have been senseless from a consumer acquisition
perspective, but I raise it here to highlight that although the name of the
company is derived from its URL, the two are, in fact, distinct.)
Saul Kripke has written that a name functions as a “rigid designator”—in
other words, it has a denotative function, conferred in a “baptismal”
moment, that remains constant despite changes to the underlying
characteristics of the thing that is named; it continues so long as a chain of
reference does.8 As Michel Foucault once wrote, if “Pierre Dupont does
not have blue eyes, or was not born in Paris, or is not a doctor, the name
Pierre Dupont will still always refer to the same person; such things do
not modify the link of designation.”9 Arguably, although the Court didn’t
frame its opinions in these terms because of the First Amendment
framework of the cases, its decisions in Tam10 and Brunetti11 can be
understood as consistent with such a theory—that concerns about the
deeply offensive connotations associated with a trademark should not be
relevant to whether the mark functions as a name. As Justice Kennedy
wrote in his concurrence in Tam, “[t]he central purpose of trademark
registration is to facilitate source identification. . . . Whether a mark is
disparaging bears no plausible relation to that goal.”12 The Court’s
decision in Booking.com can be read to be consistent with this approach:
the question of trademark validity is whether the term at issue facilitates
source identification—that is, whether it is a proper name for the good or
service at issue. Relying on the evidence below (unchallenged by the
USPTO) that consumers saw “Booking.com” as the name of a company
offering travel-related reservation services, the Court concluded that
“Booking.com” is seen as a proper name, even though it comprises generic
elements and, when part of a URL, functions as an address.
This is where I think both the majority and Justice Breyer, in his
thoughtful dissent, get off track. The majority, for its part, writes that a
[generic].com term can be source identifying because it might “convey to
https://www.gwlr.org/booking-com-b-v-how-do-we-know-when-something-is-a-name/
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consumers a source-identifying characteristic: an association with a
particular website,” given that “only one entity can occupy a particular
Internet domain name at a time.”13 Certainly consumers understand,
because of how domain names work, that a URL is associated with only
one website. But that’s not the determination the USPTO was charged
with making. The company didn’t apply to register “Booking.com” as a
URL; it applied to register the term “Booking.com” as a mark for travelreservation services. The fact that, in its function as a URL,
“www.booking.com” can be associated only with one website doesn’t make
a URL in and of itself a mark any more than the fact that there is only one
building at 123 Main Street makes “123 Main Street,” without more, a
mark for the services rendered in that building. Justice Breyer also takes
up this framework, writing, “The meaning conveyed by ‘Booking.com’ is
no more and no less than a website associated with its generic secondlevel domain, ‘booking.’”14 But here, the trademark isn’t “Booking”—it’s
“Booking.com.” Consumers asked to name both a specific company that
provides travel reservation services online and a specific company that
allows users to sell goods online might well respond by saying
“Booking.com” and “eBay”—but not “Booking” and “eBay.com.” The fact
that both opinions (and the USPTO) seemed to agree that “tennis.net”
would be a special case supports this point.15 “Tennis.net” is understood to
be a special case because it is assumed that consumers would understand
that the wordplay indicates a source-indicating name rather than simply a
URL.
Thus, the implications of the case, in my view, are not what the Court had
to say about names and source identification. The opinion reaffirms the
concept that trademark validity is about source identification and that
consumer perception is central to that determination. But consumer
perception has to be assessed carefully. The Court accurately notes, citing
an amicus brief filed by several trademark scholars, that surveys, for
example, “require care in their design and interpretation.”16 Questions
may be framed imprecisely, and the impulse to guess rather than admit
lack of understanding may skew the results. Justice Breyer, for example,
points to the survey results introduced by Booking.com in the case, which
showed that 33 percent of respondents believed
“Washingmachine.com”—“which does not correspond to any company”—
to be a brand name.17 But consumers who have heard of companies like
Booking.com or the erstwhile Pets.com might have guessed that
Washingmachine.com, as presented, is a trademark. Might there have
been a different response if the question had been, “Do you think that
www.washingmachine.com is a trademark?,” even from consumers who
understand that typing [word].com often redirects to www.[word].com?
18
Conversely, would a similar percentage of respondents have identified
any made-up word that sounded “trademarky” as a trademark, simply
because they were guessing? This survey might tell us less about the
possibility of [generic].com terms acquiring trademark status and more
about the pitfalls of survey design.19
What remains to be seen, as both opinions suggest, are the tradeoffs
involved and the extent to which the USPTO will engage in the necessary
https://www.gwlr.org/booking-com-b-v-how-do-we-know-when-something-is-a-name/
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inquiry at the outset. The concerns raised by Justice Breyer (and some
scholars and practitioners) about whether overreaching by trademark
owners can be sufficiently thwarted by more robust affirmative defenses,
particularly given that many chilling effects occur as the result of ceaseand-desist letters alone, should not be dismissed. Likewise, there are
questions about whether the USPTO should engage in more searching
review at the outset to confirm that a [generic].com mark would be
recognized as the name of a good or service rather than merely an
address. This would include requiring proof that the mark is being used in
a trademark sense and requiring disclaimers when necessary. (An
application that seeks to register www.donuts.com as a trademark for a
business called Main Street Bakery should typically be rejected, and a
business called Donuts.com seeking a trademark registration for that term
should be required to disclaim each part of that mark separately.)
Reasonable observers may conclude that these efforts are not worth the
candle.
But because the procedural posture of the case meant that the Court had
no need to engage with the facts about consumer perception, it’s difficult
to know how the case might have come out with a more nuanced inquiry.
Certainly, the Court chose a route that rejected an easily administrable
bright line rule of exclusion in favor of another general rule of trademark
validity: that trademarks are, ultimately, proper names. That choice may
end up being more difficult to manage, but it may have been the one more
faithful to the concept of trademark validity.
Laura A. Heymann is Chancellor Professor of Law at William & Mary Law
School. She has written in the areas of copyright law, trademark law, and
laws around personal names, among other subjects.
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12. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy made this observation
in connection with his view that trademark registration does not
involve the use of private speakers “to assist the government in
advancing a particular message.” Id.
13. Booking.com, slip op. at 9.
14. Id. at 6 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 8 n.4 (majority opinion); id. at 6 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 11 n.6 (majority opinion) (citing Brief for Trademark Scholars
as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, United States Patent &
Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., No 19-46 (U.S. filed Jan. 13,
2020).
17. Id. at 9 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18. Perhaps of note, www.washingmachine.com currently redirects to the
site of the home furnishing company Wayfair.
19. Relatedly, I agree with Professor McCarthy that the doctrinal term “de
facto secondary meaning”—used to describe the circumstances when
a generic term is associated in some consumers’ minds with a
particular producer—is unhelpful because it is used to describe not
secondary meaning but rather market share or some other
circumstance causing an association with the term. J. T
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T
U
C
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12:47 (5th ed. 2020).
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